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R-AppoinoN Vm=-'ONE MAN ONE VoWe-LocAL Govu4at-Re-
apportionment has come to Kentucky local government. In the early
fall of 1968, James Wallace and others presented the Hardin County
Judge with an application to reapportion Hardin County's six magis-
terial districts. When the judge failed to respond,: legal action was in-
stituted in the Hardin Circuit Court against the judge and the six
magistrates. Hardin County-population, 67,000 2-at that time was
divided into magisterial districts apportioned on the basis of county
road mileage contained in each district. However, the people were
not so neatly divided: one district was composed of only 3,600 voters,
while another which included Elizabethtown, the county seat, repre-
sented 17,000 voters.3
In the first ruling of its kind in the state, the Hardin Circuit Court
held that the Supreme Court's ruling in Avery v. Midland County,
TexasA was controlling, and that reapportionment of Hardin County
had to proceed at once.5 Wallace v. Tabb, Civil No. 8441-C (Hardin
Circuit Court, May 29, 1969).
1 The county judge refused to take any action on the ground that the
county had been reapportioned in 1966 and 1967 and that Ky. RFv. STAT.
[hereinafter KRS] 25.680 provides that a reapportionment cannot be had within
four years of a prior one.
As the case progressed, it developed that the application filed with the
county judge was not a part of the record of this action, nor was it recorded in
the county clerk's office. Apparently the county judge retained the application
and still had it in his possession or office. Furthermore, no notice of the ap-
plication was posted or published prior to the presentation. The circuit court
held that such failure of notice was fatal and that the application was therefore
void.
In the meantime plaintiffs did give proper notice, both posted and published,
of another application for reapportionment and same was presented to the countyjudge on January 20, 1969. Again the judge refused relief on the same grounds
as before. Legal action was then instituted and the decision handed down a few
days after the primary election.2 INnDUTs AL tEsouacEs-EuzazErsrowN, KENTUcK (1968). (This was
prepared by the Kentucky Department of Commerce, Division of Research and
Planning).
3 Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment at 14, Wal-
lace v. Tabb, Civil No. 8441-C (Hardin Circuit Court May 29, 1969). In the
last "reapportionment" of Hardin County, which was conducted in 1967, the






4390 U.S. 474 (1968). D
5 As to the county judge's justification for failing to act on the applications
for reapportionment the Court stated:
Further, and without regard to the validity of either the 1966 or 1967
reapportionments, plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought if it is shown
that the population of the various magisterial districts is so dis-
proportionate that redistricting is demanded under the one man one vote
(Continued on next page)
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In the Avery case, the Supreme Court held that units of local
government with general powers over a particular geographic area
must be apportioned on the basis of substantial equality of population.6
In other words, the district must be aligned on the basis of the "one
man - one vote" standard. Avery was the last apportionment case in a
series which began in 1962 when it was held in Baker v. Car 7 that
the question of legislative district apportionment was not a "political"
question and that it presented a justiciable issue. A leading case in
the series was Reynolds v. Sims 8 which held that the equal protection
clause required that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned
on a population basis. However, in Reynolds the Court did seem to
suggest that as long as population was the principal criterion, there
might be some factors that could present a "rational justification" for
deviation from the strict equal population standard.9
Soon after the Reynolds decision, speculation began as to whether or
not the "one man - one vote' principle extended to the various 81,253
units of local government in the United States. Many of the lower
courts held that it did apply to city councils, 10 county boards of super-
vision,"L county commissions, 12 county boards of education 13 and
revenue boards;14 while other courts found it not applicable to an ir-
rigation district,15 a city council,16 a county board of education,17 a
county board of revenue, 18 and a political party.19 The lower courts
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
doctrine .... Wallace v. Tabb, Civil No. 8441-C (Hardin Circuit Court,
May 29, 1969) at p. 2.
In other words, KRS § 25.680 which provides that a reapportionment cannot be
bad within four years of a prior one, is unconstitutional and ineffective if the
districts are malapportioned.
6 390 U.S. at 485.
7 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
8 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9 Id. at 579.
10 Montano v. Lee, 384 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1967); Ellis v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964), affd and remanded, 352 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1965).
11 Miller v. Board of Sup. of Santa Clara, 63 Cal.2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46
Cal. Rptr. 617 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Mauk v. Hoffman, 87 N.J. Super. 276, 209
A.2d 150 (1965).
12 Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164
(1966); Bailey v. Jones, 81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966).
13 Meyer v. Campbell, 152 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1967).
14 Robertson v. Gallion, 282 F. Supp. 157 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
15 Thompson v. Board of Dir. of Turlock Irrig., 247 Cal. App. 2d 587, 55
Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
'
8 PBlaikie v. Wagner, 258 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
17 Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent County, 254 F. Supp. 17 (W. D. Mich.
1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 105 (1967); New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. State Fed. Dist.
Bds. of Ed., 93 N. J. Super. 31, 224 A.2d 519 (1966).
18 Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), remanded, 387
U.S. 97 (1967).
19 Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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in reaching their decisions seemed to have used two major criteria:
(1) whether the unit performed essentially legislative functions as op-
posed to administrative functions, and (2) whether there was a
rational justification for deviating from the equal population standard.20
Until Avery, the Supreme Court had avoided ruling as to the limits
of the "one man - one vote" doctrine. In 1967, Sailors v. Board of
Education2' held that an essentially administrative body chosen
by a procedure essentially appointive was exempt. The Court again
dodged the issue in Dusch v. Davis2 2 when it assumed that the ap-
portionment of local units was governed by Reynolds but held that the
challenged local apportionment plan did not contain the elements
necessary to invoke the "one man - one vote" principle.
But the Court met the issue head-on in the Avery case, using it as a
"vehicle" to announce the application under the fourteenth amendment
of the "one man - one vote" doctrine to local government.23 However,
one must take notice that Avery is limited to local government with
"general governmental powers." The Court stated that a local govern-
ment with "general governmental powers" included a county govern-
ment having the power to make a large number of decisions having a
broad range effect on all the citizens of the county.24 Other than this
statement the Court did not define the term "general governmental
powers," but it seemed to be suggesting that the issue should turn
on those legislative powers statutorily delegated to the county
20 See 35 BRoox:rYN L. REv. 292, 294-95. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1963).
21387 U.S. 105 (1967). In a footnote the Court attempted to explain its
conclusion:
The delegates from the local school boards, not the school electors,
select the members of the county school board. While the school electors
elect the members of the local school boards and the local school boards,
in turn, select delegates to attend the meeting at which the county board
is selected, the delegates need not cast their votes in accord with the
expressed preferences of the school electors .... It is evident, therefore,
that the membership of the county board is not determined, directly or
indirectly, through an election in which the residents of the county
participate. The 'electorate" under the Michigan system is composed not
of the people of the county, but the delegates from the local school
boards. Id. at 109.
22387 U.S. 112 (1967). The plan, called the "Virginia Beach type plan,"
divides the unit into smaller units of substantially equal populations each
electing a councilman and in addition combining these units to elect another
smaller group of councilmen. These councilmen would be required to reside in
specified areas of the combined unit, not as representatives but as persons
familiar with particular needs and desires. Therefore, this was held not to be
an evasive scheme, but a rational variance.
23 See Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportion-
ment Options, 36 GEo. WAsia. L. REv. 693, 701 (1968).24390 U.S. at 483.
25390 U.S. at 480. In a discussion of which governmental bodies should be
governed by the doctrine, the Court said:
(Continued on next page)
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governing body and not the day-to-day functions which it performs.2 5
In other words, the Court was indicating that the test would be what
the government was authorized to do and not what it had actually
been doing.
Due to the lack of a clear definition of the term "general govern-
mental powers" and the Court's reaffirmation of the Sailors and Dusch
cases, some authorities think that Avery is ambiguous and that the
Court will have to further define its rule in a future case.2 6 However,
it seems very clear that the Court was trying to limit the "one man - one
vote" principle to local legislative units which have their membership
elected from single member districts.
The Court is aware of the immense pressures facing units of local
government and of the greatly varying problems with which they
must deal. The Constitution does not require that a uniform
strait jacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local govern-
ment suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local prob-
lems . . . .The Sailors and Dusch cases demonstrate that the
Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks in the path of in-
novation, experiment, and development among units of local
government. Our decision today is only that the Constitution im-
poses one ground rule for the development of arrangements of
local government: a requirement that units with general govern-
mental powers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned
among single-member districts of substantially unequal popula-
tion. (Emphasis added) 27
Therefore, it would seem that the Avery principle should dearly apply
to Kentucky counties with the fiscal court2s as it governing body and
to cities of the fourth class which have their councilmen selected from
wards.29 Although the determination as to "general governmental
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
When the State apportions its legislature, it must have due regard for
the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, when the State delegates law-
making power to local government and provides for the election of local
officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter,
it must insure that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally
effective voice in the election process. Id. at 480.
See also 21 S.C. L. RE;v. 102, 105-06 (1968).
26 See 21 S.C. L. REv. 102, 105-06 (1968).
27 390 U.S. at 485.
28 Ky. CONST. art. 4, § 144 provides that the fiscal court consists of the county
judge and the justices of the peace or a county may have three commissioners
elected from the county at large. Ky. CONST. art. 4, § 142 provides that each
county shall be divided into no less than three nor more than eight districts in
each of which a justice of the peace shall be elected.
29 KRS § 86.220 provides that ". . . member[s] of the city council shall be
elected by the qualified voters of the ward for which he stands, or if the city
is not divided into wards, by the qualified voters of the city."
See Ky. CONST. ch. 156. Since Kentucky chose the classified charter method,
there are several alternatives available to the different municipalities. The authors
(Continued on next page)
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powers" was not apparent in the Wallace case, it seems that the fiscal
courts are delegated such powers under section 67.080 of the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes.30 The authorizations seem to be very similar
to those delegated to Midland County by the Texas legislature 31 and
there would appear to be no alternative for the Kentucky courts except
to apply the Avery rule as was done in the Wallace case.
Assuming that the courts will require some Kentucky counties to
reapportion, what will be the effect? A few counties would not be
directly affected because the members of their governing bodies are
elected at large. 32 The impact would be felt in some rural counties
which are presently malapportioned. Although no exhaustive study
has been conducted, a good estimate would be that some fifty counties
in Kentucky will be affected.33
The major impact could be a change in county policies brought
about by the new urban interests, which have previously played no
major role in county politics. Furthermore, we would probably see
more public confidence in the government resulting from the "repre-
sentativeness" of the counties. This increasing confidence could bring
more support for expanded county services and the taxes needed to
support them.34 The result could be a consolidation of functions which
the city and county have previously been performing separately, thus
leading to more economy and efficiency in government.3 5
However, there could be weaknesses in this theory. In his dissent
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of the 1891 Constitution believed that the problems and needs of small towns
were quite different from those of larger cities, and they accordingly estabLshed
six classes of municipalities on the basis of population.
It must be noted that this writing will primarily involve a discussion of
reapportionment at the county level.
30The fiscal courts may appropriate county funds, sell and convey real
estate belonging to the county, regulate and control fiscal affairs and property of
the county, provide for good condition of the highways in the county, and
execute all order relating to the levying of taxes as is conferred on the Court by
law.
31 See 390 U.S. at 483, where the Court states that the county commis-
sioner's court has power to set the tax rate, issue bonds, prepare a budget and
make long-range judgments about the way the county should develop.32 KRS § 67.050 provides that any county may have a fiscal court consisting of
a county judge and three commisioners elected from the county at large. How-
ever, this commission form of government must be approved by the voters. KRS
§ 67.065 provided that all counties having a population of 75,000 or over shall
have the commissioner form of county government. This section was determined
to be unconstitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Billiter v. Nelson,
300 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1957), and was repealed in 1966.33 Interview with A. Wallace Grafton, Jr., Attorney for the Plaintiff, in
Louisville, Ky., August 6, 1969.
34 See Grant & McArthur, "One Man-One Vote" and County Government:
Rural, Urban and Metropolitan Implications, 36 CEo. WAsH. L. REv. 760, 767-68
(1968)
36 Id. at 774-75.
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in Avery, Justice Fortas demonstrated a concern for the rural resi-
dent. He objected to subjecting local government to the inflexible
and simplistic approach of the "one man - one vote" standard.36
Fortas stated that the equal protection clause did not demand a strict
application of the "one man -one vote" principle, because its inflexi-
bility ignored the fact that many local functions which are limited and
specialized have an unequal effect on the county's residents.37 To him,
the Avery decision meant that the county residents would be denied
meaningful representation because only in an artificial sense did the
commissioners have general governmental powers, their primary
interest being rural roads. Fortas concluded, therefore, that the rural
persons vote would become substantially unequal with the urban
voter's since the rural interests have a greater stake than the non-rural
interests. However, it has been pointed out that Justice Fortas might
have overlooked "one potentially critical factor."8 'It may be that
one way to make county government 'general purpose' and effective
is to require a 'one man - one vote' reformation within reasonable
limits." 3 9
It is apparent that there are more questions to be answered in the
apportionment cases, namely, questions involving the nature of the
representative process. In Sailors the Court pointed out that it saw
36390 U.S. 474, 499 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
37 For an exhaustive study of the Avery case, see 21 VAND. L. REv. 1104
(1968).
Determining that the commissioners court in the instant case was a
special-purpose unit with limited powers and functions which were
oriented toward the rural population in Midland County and not toward
the urban population which had another governing body to manage
its governmental affairs, Justice Fortas concluded that it would debase
the substantive equality of the rural person's vote if it were mechanically
equalized with that of the urban voter since the rural person had the
greater interest in the court.
Two dissenters persuasively pointed out that irrespective of the scope of
the authority granted to a local unit, the "general power" standard
ignored the reality of the functioning process of special-purpose units.
Id. at 1107-08.
See also Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on
Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 21,
32-33 (1965). Criteria are established for determing whether the unit is special-
functioning rather than general: (1) how many functions the unit has; (2)
whether the unit is reasonably designed to achieve an end appropriate for a
special-function unit, i.e., water supply, sewage disposal, or other special services;
and (3) how well the representational formula for selecting members of the unit
reflects population. Weinstein feels that a rough estimate would be valid for
special purpose districts. Id. This article contains an excellent discussion of the
various forms of local governmental units and the effect that extension of the
one man-one vote doctrine would have on them.
38 See Dixon, supra note 23, at 704.
a9 Id. at 704.
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nothing in the Constitution which prevented experimentation,40 and
in Dusch, Douglas stated that the particular form of at-large election
seemed "to reflect a detente between urban and rural communities
that may be important in resolving the complex problems of the
modern megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural
countryside." (Emphasis added) 4'
Avery reaffirmed these decisions and stated "... the Constitution
and this Court are not roadblocks in the path of innovation, experi-
ment, and development among units of local government" 42 With
these statements in mind, one can see that the Court is concerned both
with rural residents and with local government being representative.
One desirable innovation might be to gerrymander (i.e. to divide
an area into political units in an unnatural way with the purpose of
giving special advantages to one group), applying the "one man - one
vote" standard while promoting true representative equality, thus
"reflectling] a detente between urban and rural communities." The
rural community's fear of the "one man - one vote" principle is justi-
fied on the grounds that its voice in government would be diluted.
Although the Court has been critical of gerrymandering, 43 it has never
stated that the practice was unconstitutional per se.44 It is highly pos-
sible that reapportionment of districts to serve a partisan interest
would not be ruled unconstitutional. 45
Dr. Malcolm E. Jewel, 46 in a recent law review article, while not
openly advocating gerrymandering as a solution to the problem of
applying the inflexible "one man - one vote" doctrine to local govern-
ment, does discuss gerrymandering and appears to suggest it might
be a solution to the urban-rural problem.47 Jewell states that ".... as
long as the Court receives the apportionment issue to be fundamentally
a question of voting rights, it is not likely to declare that partisan
gerrymandering violates the Fourteenth Amendment."48 Moreover, he
40 387 U.S. at 111.
41387 U.S. at 117.
42 390 U.S. at 485.43 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that racial gerrymandering is in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339(1960).
44 See Jewell, Local Systems of Representation: Political Consequences and
Judicial Choices, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 790, 796 (1968).
45 See generally Comment, Political Gerrymandering: The Law and Politics
of Partisan Districting, 35 GEo. WAH. L. REv. 143 (1967). See-also Sinock v.
Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967). Two viewpoints as to the consti-
tutionality of partisan gerrymandering are discussed in the majority and dis-
senting opinions.46 Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.47 See generally Jewell, supra note 44 at 790.
48 Id. at 797.
19701
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feels that this form of gerrymandering meets one of the criteria for a
political question as defined in Baker v. Carr: "a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it."49
Since its 1960 decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,50 in which gerry-
mandering for purposes of racial discrimination was held unconsti-
tutional, the Supreme Court has decided only one case pertinent to
this discussion.
In Wright v. Rockefeller,51 the use of racial factors in establishing
district boundaries in order to assure that a racial minority had
representation was declared not violative of the Constitution. There-
fore, it seems logical to assume that the Court would not rule uncon-
stitutional a districting plan in which the "one man - one vote"
principle was applied, and yet, in Wright, the district boundaries were
so drawn (gerrymandered) as to further the representation of a
minority (either urban or rural).
The Wallace case has signalled the arrival of reapportionment in
Kentucky. But it has not necessarily signalled the stifling of the rural
minority voice in local government. The door is still open for local
legislative units to innovate within constitutional limits some method of
redistricting which would promote true representation for both rural
and urban interests. It is submitted that this innovation could best be
carried out by combining the principle of "one man - one vote" with
the technique of gerrymandering as described above.
Joseph H. Terry
REAL PROPERTY-IMPLIED WARRANTY IN SALE OF NEw HOUSE By
VENDoR.-A husband and wife purchased a new house from the
builder-owner. Several months after moving in, the purchasers dis-
covered that water seeped through the basement walls every time it
rained and would not drain out. Suit was brought alleging breach of
an implied warranty. The jury found for the plaintiffs. Held: Affirmed.
In selling a new house, builder was bound by an implied warranty
49 Professor Jewell states:
There is no ideal standard against which to measure an allegedly gerry-
mandered districting plan . . . . The factors that have discouragedjudicial attack on partisan gerrymandering in state legislative districts
would seem to be equally applicable to cases of gerrymandering that
occur in local units of government. Id. at 797.60364 U.S. 339 (1960).
51376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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